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TH E CULTU RA L C O N T R A D IC T IO N S  O F SO CIA LISM
By  C h a n d r a n  K u k a t h a s
Render possessions ever so equal, m en's different degrees of art, care, 
and industry  will im m ediately break that equality. Or if you check 
these virtues, you reduce society to the m ost extreme indigence; and 
instead of preventing w ant and beggary in a few, render it unavoid­
able to the whole community. The m ost rigorous inquisition too is 
requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance; and the 
m ost severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it. But besides, that so 
m uch authority  m ust soon degenerate into tyranny, and be exerted 
w ith such great partialities; w ho can possibly be possessed of it, in 
such a situation as is here supposed?
—David H um e1
I. S o c i a l i s m ' s D e s t in y
W hile no one has yet announced the death of capitalism, reports of its 
im m inent dem ise have been as num erous as they have been exaggerated. 
Such reports have usually been bolstered by thoughtful analyses of the 
fundam ental contradictions of capitalism, which w as expected to come 
slid ing—if not crashing—dow n under the w eight of its own inconsisten­
cies. Leaving aside Karl M arx's own predictions, tw entieth-century ana­
lysts as diverse as Joseph Schumpeter, Daniel Bell, and Jurgen Haberm as 
have asserted that the contradictions of capitalism could only mean that 
its days were num bered.2 Alas, all that has been established by these 
analyses is that predictive failure is no im pedim ent to m arket success: 
either the consum er's dem and for such theories of capitalism 's failures is 
naturally  robust, or supply  continues to generate its own dem and.
More recently, however, socialist w riters have been forced by certain 
events to turn their attention to the reasons for the failure of socialism. 
Nowhere has anything remotely resembling the socialist model of a good 
society appeared. And the societies that undertook serious attem pts to 
build socialism produced only tyranny and hum an misery. The more 
vigorous the attem pt, the more vicious the tyranny, and the more com-
1 David H um e, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in H um e, Enquiries Con­
cerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. I,. A. Selby-Bigge, 
rev. P. H. N idditch, 3d ed. (Oxford: C larendon Press, 1975), 194.
2 See loseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Yale University 
Press, 1942); Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (London: Heinem an, 1976); 
and Jurgen Haberm as, Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinem an, 1979).
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plete the misery. The revolutions of 1989 suggested to m any that the 
populations of the former socialist states decisively rejected socialism. For 
m any socialists, however, the social experiments that were the Soviet Union, 
Cambodia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Viet­
nam , and Yugoslavia (like the continuing ones in Cuba, N orth Korea, and, 
to a lesser degree, China) were not experim ents in genuine socialism, since 
genuine socialist transform ation w as prevented by state ty ran n y  For 
others, like John Roemer, the problem lies, in part, in socialism 's lack of a 
sound economic theory.3 And yet others have continued to w onder whether 
som e m odified version of socialism, stripped of its n ineteenth-century 
naivete about economic planning and cleansed of its tw entieth-century 
totalitarian associations, m ight not have a better shot of supplanting cap­
italism not only in practice, bu t also in the m ind of the public.
The thesis of this essay is that the achievem ent of socialism is unlikely 
because the reasons for its failure stem not from such contingent factors, 
but have their roots in the aspirations of socialism itself. Socialism is by 
its very nature doom ed to failure. This is not to say that socialists are 
doom ed to political failure, for socialist political leaders and parties will 
undoubtedly  come to pow er from time to time. It is sim ply to say that the 
doctrine by which socialists are guided is destined never to be fulfilled. 
Economically, it cannot succeed for reasons that critics like F. A. Hayek 
and Ludwig von Mises advanced.4 The deeper problem, however, is not 
economic but political.
Socialism, in the end, lacks not only a plausible economic theory, but 
also a coherent political one. Indeed, in m ost of the variants articulated by 
socialist theoreticians, from Marx to the present, it lacks a political theory 
altogether. Socialist thinkers have usually presented social transform ation
3 See John Roemer, Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic Theory (Cambridge: C am ­
bridge University Press, 1989).
4 Ludw ig von Mises had argued as early as 1920 that socialism was technically impossible 
because, in the absence of prices set by com petitive m arkets, producers w ould be unable to 
m ake even sim ple decisions about w hat to m ake, or to decide w hich inputs to choose in the 
production process. The absence of prices w ould m ake it impossible to tell which m aterials 
were scarcer or m ore valuable. See L udw ig von Mises, Socialism: A n Economic and Sociological 
Analysis, trans. J. Kahane (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1981). This argum ent was also pu t 
forw ard by F. A. H ayek in the 1930s in his critique of socialism 's leading theoreticians, such 
as Oskar Lange and H. D. Dickinson. H ayek suggested that, under socialism, the absence of 
prices w ould m ake com parative cost calculation impossible: the centralization of production 
decisions w ould lead to the discoordination betw een the dem and and supply of goods. The 
result w ould be inefficiency, chronic shortages of some goods and the oversupply of others, 
and, ultimately, m aterial poverty. Indeed, H ayek thought that this problem  w ould rem ain 
even under m odified variants of socialism such as "m arket socialism." See F. A. Hayek, ed., 
Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies in the Possibilities of Socialism (London: Rout- 
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1935). See also H ayek 's essays on socialist calculation in F. A. Hayek, 
Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: Midway, 1980). For a m odern  discussion of the 
socialist calculation debate, see Don Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Cal­
culation Debate Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1985). For recent d e ­
bate am ong socialists on these issues, see Bertell Oilman, ed., Market Socialism: The Debate 
Among Socialists (New York: Routledge, 1998).
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as the solution to social ills, since the source of those ills has been held to 
be the social and economic order in which private interests and m arket 
relations are dom inant. Once m arket relations are transform ed, they have 
assum ed, the w ay w ould be open for rule by the collective in the interest 
of the whole. In these circumstances, there is little need to say anything 
about how  political institutions under socialism w ould check and control 
the exercise of power. The problem  of the abuse of pow er no longer needs 
to be considered. It is liberal political theory that has focused on the 
problem  of controlling the abuse of power, since it assum es that there will 
alw ays be a danger of such abuse—for in any society there will always be 
particular interests trying to gain advantages for themselves. Tyranny is 
alw ays possible. But socialism assum es—or hopes—that such problem s 
will not arise, and so does not assum e the need for a political theory. 
Indeed, were it to borrow  from a theory of politics (such as the liberal 
theory) that m ight help it address the problem  of tyranny, it w ould u n ­
derm ine altogether the assum ptions underp inn ing  its economic am ­
bitions. Yet in avoiding such borrow ing, socialism has also avoided 
addressing the problem  of how  there can be a socialist order that is not 
sim ply a dictatorship by a socialist political elite. This is true of the so­
cialisms described by alm ost every socialist thinker, even though all of 
them  envisage the good socialist order not as a dictatorship, bu t as a 
society m arked by collective self-rule for the good of the whole.
The argum ent of this essay is that socialists are destined to be disap­
pointed, for w hat they w ant sim ply cannot be achieved under any form 
of socialism. To defend this contention, this essay is divided into a num ­
ber of sections. Section II begins by considering w hat socialism is, taking 
note of its variety of forms, bu t looking to establish w hat is crucially 
im portant to the socialist ideal in general. Section III then turns to the 
economic critique of socialism, briefly recounting the reasons for its fail­
ure as an economic system. Section IV, however, goes on to argue that it 
is not the economics of socialism that is the problem, bu t the politics, 
explaining w hy at the heart of socialist theory there is no understanding 
of either hum an nature or hum anity 's political predicam ent and, sub­
sequently, no theory for dealing w ith that predicam ent. Section V then 
moves on to consider some m odern attem pts to rethink socialism, and 
argues that these are unlikely to be successful. This essay concludes with 
some general reflections on the dem ise of socialism and w hat it m eans not 
only for the socialist ideal, bu t also for other political utopias.
II. W h a t  Is S o c i a l i s m ?
The difficulty of defining, or identifying with reasonable precision, a 
term  as protean as 'socialism ' cannot go unrem arked in any effort to 
establish a working definition. It is a term  which has been used to de­
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scribe economic systems, political regimes, and social movem ents, as well 
as a kind of ethical ideal. It is quite correct to say that it is a system of 
economic organization in which private property  and the distribution of 
income are subject to collective social control, rather than determ ined by 
the efforts of individuals pursuing their own interests. W hat exactly 'col­
lective control' means, though, is a m atter for debate. It is quite correct to 
say that socialism is the negation of capitalism, since that is how socialists 
have com m only defined their creed for nearly two centuries. But what, 
exactly, capitalism am ounts to is no less contentious than is the definition 
of its antithesis. It is also correct to note, however, that socialism, as a 
philosophical doctrine that values community, rejects above all the indi­
vidualism  it sees at the heart of liberal political thinking. Yet w hat exactly 
it is about individualism  that socialism repudiates is a m atter that has 
forced socialists into endless debate.5
The problem of defining socialism does not get any easier w ith  the 
proliferation of kinds of socialism. Before Karl Marx, num erous varieties 
of socialism proliferated in the writings of such thinkers as Claude-Henri 
de Rouvroy Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, and Pierre- 
Joseph Proudhon. Even M arxian socialism comes in a num ber of kinds; it 
was joined by guild socialism and Christian socialism in the nineteenth 
century, and various forms of noncom m unist socialism in the Western 
European countries of the tw entieth century. Fabian socialism appeared 
in Britain in 1884, while English ethical socialism emerged after World 
War II. And, of course, the socialism of the centrally planned command 
economy was attem pted in the Soviet Union and its satellites. Since the 
dem ise of Soviet socialism, both as a theory and as a regime, various 
theories of m arket socialism have gained a greater prom inence in the 
literature of political theory and political economy. H ow can a definition 
of socialism be found that m ight make sense of this variety? Indeed, one 
has to w onder w hether it m akes sense even to talk about 'socialism ' as 
such, since concepts w ith  long histories often have vastly different m ean­
ings in different eras.
There is a further reason w hy defining socialism is a m atter that should 
be approached w ith  some caution, particularly in any kind of critical 
endeavor. A term that could encompass a great range of theories, but 
describes each only imperfectly, threatens to do violence to the argum ents 
and theories of individual socialist thinkers. It is all too easy, and com­
mon, for critics to lum p their opponents into a general category and then 
to dism iss them by attacking the category, even if m any of those thinkers 
have them selves recognized the difficulties in their general theoretical 
orientations and have sought to m odify their own theoretical variants. If
5 For a general history  of socialism that discusses its various attitudes tow ard indi­
v idualism , see George Lichtheim, A  Short History of Socialism (London: W eidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1970).
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the purpose of finding a definition of socialism is to criticize socialism, it 
is im portant that such a definition capture w hat is central, and necessary, 
to it rather than only those features which are expendable.
It is im portant, in the end, to establish w hat lies at the core of the 
socialist idea because socialists continue to line up  behind its banner and 
to defend their offerings in its terms. And if a general critique is to be 
offered of this brand of politics, a general definition of some kind has to 
be found. A helpful place to start m ight be G. A. C ohen's reflections on 
the nature of the ideal that socialists like him self hoped to see realized by 
the Soviet Union. This ideal was a society that included,
instead of the class exploitation of capitalism, economic equality; 
instead of the illusory democracy of class-based bourgeois politics, a 
real and complete democracy; instead of the alienation from one 
another of economic agents driven by greed and fear, an economy 
characterized by willing m utual service.6
W hat socialism wishes to supplant is an economic system, and a form 
of social organization more generally, in which economic relations allow 
the strong to dom inate the weak, in which the political relations allow the 
economically powerful few to control the people as a whole, and in which 
hum an relations are such that people cooperate for m utual gain out of 
self-interest rather than out of fellow-feeling. Such a system could not be 
eradicated unless it were replaced by one in which the shape of society 
w as the product not of the blind p lay of individual choices bu t of the 
conscious and deliberate direction of the society as a whole.
W hat socialism seeks, above all, even if not exclusively, is a kind of 
unity. A socialist society is not a divided society—divided by the bound­
aries that distinguish people into classes, separating rich from poor, and 
see some individuals rule over others. A socialist society is one in which 
society's interests are attended to by society collectively. According to 
socialism, this requires a society in w hich economic production is con­
trolled not by private individuals, bu t by society as a whole. This m eans 
social rather than private ownership of the economy. In such a society, 
there is no division between labor and capital. Socialism is a system 
characterized by social or collective ownership or control of the produc­
tive property  of society. Its m ost powerful advocate was Karl Marx, and 
its antithesis from the beginning w as the "system of natural liberty" 
advocated by Adam  Smith in his defense of commercial society. Its phil­
osophical advocates today are num erous, and their nemeses in the late 
twentieth century are proponents of libertarian theories, such as F. A. 
H ayek and Robert Nozick.
6 G. A. Cohen, Self-Oiimership, Freedom, atul Equality (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity 
Press, 1995), 253.
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Socialists today, to the extent that they have been chastened not only by 
the collapse of Soviet pow er and  the fall of Com m unist regimes, but also 
by the obvious poverty of socialist societies, have conceded that m uch of 
socialist economic theory is unsustainable. In particular, m any have ac­
cepted that the argum ents advanced by economists of the A ustrian school, 
explaining w hy socialism could not succeed, were fundam entally sound.
The m ost pow erful argum ents challenging the feasibility of socialism, 
as noted above, came from economists of the A ustrian school, such as 
F. A. H ayek and  Ludwig von Mises. It is w orth  observing that m any 
socialists have conceded that these argum ents were decisive against par­
ticular aspects of the socialist idea. A dam  Przeworski, for example, is one 
socialist w riter w ho concedes that the m odel of "com m and" socialism 
developed in the Soviet Union w as unable to w ithstand the A ustrian 
critique, w hich w as decisive in dem onstrating that socialist central p lan­
ning w as an im plausible ideal. First, even if the p lanner had  genuine 
information, the sheer complexity of the problem  w ould  m ake rational 
allocation of productive resources and distribution of ou tput am ong house­
holds impossible to handle. Second, if individuals are at all self-interested, 
the p lanner cannot find out the true needs of households and  the true 
capacities of firms w ithout the use of markets. Third, there is no reason to 
think that p lanners in any case have any incentive to prom ote the general 
welfare, and  there are no m onitoring m echanisms in the social p lan that 
w ould  serve such a purpose. Finally, the entire enterprise rested not only 
on the planners solving the calculational problem , bu t also on economic 
agents, w hich include households, firms, and  planners, as co-owners of 
society's w ealth, cooperating to support collective welfare. But, as Prze­
w orski observes, "none of these assum ptions has w orked under really 
existing socialism ."/ This w as m ade quite clear by H ayek and  Mises, and 
w as am ply confirmed by experience.
Similarly, Cohen has adm itted  that two of the four major socialist ob­
jections to the m arket—that it w as inefficient and  that it w as anarchic— 
were sim ply misplaced. The traditional socialist view that the m arket was 
unplanned failed to understand  how  well the unplanned m arket orga­
nized inform ation, and  how difficult it w as for a central p lanner to ac­
quire the inform ation about preferences and  production  possibilities 
dispersed throughout the market. Cohen states: "Even if the p lanner's  
com puter could do w onders w ith  that inform ation, there w ould  remain 
the problem  that there are systematic obstacles to gathering it: to that 
extent, Von Mises and  H ayek were rig h t."8
7 A dam  Przeworski, "Socialism and Social Democracy," in Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford 
Companion to the Politics of the World, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 777.
8 Cohen, Self-Oionership, Freedom, and Equality, 260.
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And indeed, in the w orld of tw entieth-century practice, socialist econ­
omies failed to achieve the levels of wealth attained not only by the 
capitalist West, bu t even by m any developing nations. Living standards 
in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the 1980s could barely 
match those of Malaysia, let alone Singapore. For all of Nikita K rush­
chev's prom ises in the late 1950s and early 1960s that the U.S.S.R. was 
about to overtake the United States, history saw the Soviet economy in 
the 1970s and 1980s fall deeper and deeper into crisis, struggling to feed, 
clothe, and house its own population. Socialist economics generated not 
greater w ealth bu t greater poverty.
Yet even as its critics argued that socialism w ould not deliver economic 
prosperity, and practical experience in socialist states dem onstrated this 
for all to see, for m uch of the twentieth century, socialism 's theoretical 
defenders had the better of the argum ent—if success is m easured by 
intellectual popularity. Socialist economic theory was taken seriously in 
Western academies, and economists like Oskar Lange and H. D. Dickin­
son were w idely held to have had the better of the debate w ith Hayek and 
Mises in the 1930s over the problem  of economic calculation under so­
cialism. And even in the latter part of the twentieth century, those who 
conceded that the Austrian critique of socialist economics was persuasive 
argued that a modified variant of socialism —like "m arket socialism" — 
w ould prove successful. A part of the problem, however, w as that the 
empirical evidence w as not favorable. N ot only had the model of socialist 
central planning been found w anting in a stagnating Soviet Union, but 
even in Yugoslavia, w here a form of m arket socialism had been tried, the 
results were not encouraging. If socialism was an economic system in 
which the right to accum ulate capital was limited and the m arket for 
labor w as restricted or nonexistent, socialism sim ply could not produce 
the goods. To some extent, this was recognized by some socialists m any 
years ago w hen they conceded that m arkets and private property had an 
im portant part to play in any good society.9
Yet even if this is the case, some w riters m aintain that defenders of 
capitalism  need to be more cognizant of the fact that the m arket, or 
capitalism, has im portant defects. These defects are moral defects, for 
m arkets corrode morality. Two kinds of challenges need to be noted here: 
the first points to empirical evidence of the m arket's inadequacy, and the 
second points out theoretical reasons for w hy m arkets do not sustain 
morally acceptable societies.
The empirical point is m ade quite clearly by Canadian political philos­
opher Ronald Beiner, w ho concedes that socialism m ay be less productive 
than capitalism, bu t openly asks w hether the inefficiency of socialism 
m ay not in fact be an asset: "It is hardly ever considered that it m ay in fact
9 One of the earliest to do  so w as British socialist theorist, C. A. R. Crosland, notably in 
C. A. R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956).
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constitute a political advantage of socialism that such economies operate 
less efficiently and thus offer fewer goods to be d is tr ib u te d /'10 Beiner 
w ants not only to suggest that there are things that are more im portant 
than productivity, consum ption, or economic growth, bu t also to point 
out serious defects in capitalist societies that are not weighed in the 
balance w hen they are com pared w ith socialist ones. For example, he cites 
low crime and unem ploym ent rates in the Soviet Union as underrated  
m easures of socialism 's own achievements. On the converse side, he adds, 
"it is scarcely less stunning that pervasive drug taking, ram pant sexual 
exploitation, the addiction to consum erist lifestyles', and the ubiquity  of 
the credit card in Western societies are not com m only taken as key indi­
cators of political debility relative to other societies."11 N ot surprisingly, 
Beiner is sym pathetic to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's critique of Western 
freedom as the source also of Western debauchery: the West's wealth is 
spent on sex and drugs, rather than on finer pursuits.
Beiner's argum ents about crime and unem ploym ent being virtually ab­
sent under Soviet socialism are not persuasive. As the Soviet Union began 
to stagnate under the Brezhnev adm inistration, full em ploym ent contin­
ued to exist only in nam e as people were kept shuffling goods and paper 
in uneconomic enterprises (which produced less than they consum ed) or 
in pointless public-service positions—all for pitiful wages. ("They pretend 
to pay us, and we pretend to work.") The poverty of Soviet citizens was 
sim ply the inescapable consequence of a backward economy in which most 
of the factories and production plants were found to be worthless by the 
Western com panies that acquired them in the 1990s. As to the absence of 
crime, it is sim ply w rong to suggest that it w as negligible. Pilfering of com­
m unal property  was rife—unsurprisingly, given the poverty endured by 
m ost Soviet citizens. And statistics revealing these, as well as more seri­
ous, crimes were sim ply suppressed by a regime unw illing and unable to 
address the problem. It is also w orth noting that the penalty for criminal 
conviction was frequently exile into smaller centers, remote from the large 
cities, so that, unusually, smaller towns had  higher crime rates than did 
big cities in the Soviet Union.12 Claims about socialism 's success in the 
Soviet Union have always been greatly exaggerated.13
10 Ronald Beiner, What's the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkeley: U niversity of California 
Press, 1992), 152. (Beiner's book w as first published in 1992, and is w ritten  in full awareness 
of the dem ise of com m unism  initiated by  the revolutions of 1989.)
11 Ibid., 153.
12 In one way, however, the low  crime rate in the Soviet U nion is beside the point: it was 
also low  in the World War II death  cam ps at Dachau and Belsen, bu t this is h ard ly  w orth  
p u tting  into the equation.
13 For an  analysis of poverty  under Soviet Com m unism , see M ervyn M atthew s, Poverty in 
the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1986). For m ore general assess­
m ents of the w eaknesses of the Soviet socialist system, see Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: 
The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1992); and Tim­
othy J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soi'iet Union (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1986), esp. 32-67.
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But Beiner has a point, nonetheless. Wealth does bring w ith it more 
debauchery and excess. The only purpose of production is consumption; 
the m ore that is produced, the m ore that will be consumed. And this will 
m ean that even as m ore fine w ine is produced, so will more cheap liquor 
be drunk; as m ore music is w ritten and played, so will m ore vulgar noise 
be m arketed and listened to by m ore and m ore people; and as more fine 
philosophical papers are produced, defending (or asking w hat's  the m at­
ter with) liberalism, so will m ore cheap m agazines appear detailing the 
exploits of the Duchess of York. D rugs and pornography are the product 
of economic and political freedom, at least insofar as they cannot be 
produced if people are not allowed, or cannot afford, to have them — 
though it w ould be im plausible to suggest that such things are not to be 
found in unfree societies at all. But if poverty is the solution, m any think 
that the cure is w orse than the disease.14 In the end, m arket freedom 
brings bad along w ith the good: the vulgar accom pany the refined, the 
ugly the beautiful, the shallow the profound, and the grotesque the blessed. 
Those w ho think that one can be had w ithout the other are mistaken.
There is, however, a deeper objection that socialists raise against cap­
italism. The problem w ith m arket societies is that they not only condone 
the pursu it of baubles and trinkets that have no real w orth, but they also 
w ork to underm ine the very values upon which m arkets rely. M arkets 
depend upon the existence of moral standards, for unless people are 
prepared to keep prom ises and honor contracts, production and exchange 
w ould not be possible. But m arkets, by encouraging selfish consum ption, 
teach people to become competitively self-regarding rather than cooper­
atively moral. Capitalism, it is sometimes said, consum es its own moral 
capital.
This claim, however, is not so readily defensible. It is a variant of the 
argum ent Rousseau presents in his Discourse on the Origin o f Inequality,15 
which offers a conjectural history that explores hum an nature, as well as 
its transform ation w ith the emergence of m arket society. As individuals 
become socialized, they learn to compare them selves w ith one another 
and to crave the good opinions of their fellows—learning, in the end, to 
become vain and deceitful (a talent for deceit being am ong the qualities 
m ost necessary for advancem ent).16 Is this not w hat happens in m arket 
societies, as people discover that the best w ay to get ahead is to appear 
w hat they are not, and, even better, to take advantage of their fellows? 
In fact, as Adam  Smith argued in his Theory o f Moral Sentiments, the
14 Some, of course, think that the disease is no t that bad; bu t that is another matter.
15 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, in Rousseau, The Social 
Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole, rev. J. H. Brumfitt, John C. Hall, and P. D. Jimack 
(London: Everym an, 1993), 31-126.
16 Rousseau, however, d id  no t suggest that commercial society w as the cause of this 
transform ation. Nor, in the end, d id  he  think that abandoning commercial society w as a 
plausible solution.
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reverse is more likely true. M orality develops not under the direction 
of an au thority—under the guidance of the "m an of system "—but spon­
taneously—under the guidance of an "invisible h an d ."17 W hat makes 
people moral is precisely w hat Rousseau thought m ade people vain: the 
craving for the good opinion of others. Indeed, Smith argued, so much 
did people internalize the longing for approval that they came to desire 
not mere approval, b u t worthiness of approval.
In capitalist societies, so much turns on approval by o thers—one's 
fellows generally, rather than merely those in au thority—that the best 
strategy to adopt is to become w orthy  Of course, one m ight do even 
better if one were duplicitous while m ost others were honest. But at the 
same time, when so m uch turns on people's reputations, everyone also 
has an incentive to invest resources in checking on people's reputations. 
So the costs of dishonesty can be high. This argum ent is not, of course, to 
suggest that there is no dishonesty or im m orality in m arket societies. 
Quite the contrary The point is that, just as there are features of m arket 
society that underm ine moral conduct, so are there features of it that also 
generate moral behavior. Maybe capitalism will eventually run out of 
moral capital; bu t it probably will not any time soon.
In the end, however, no account of the failings of capitalism has been 
enough to dem onstrate that socialism is not beset by insuperable eco­
nomic problems. M any socialists have thus conceded that some rapproche­
m ent is needed between socialism and the market. For some, this m eans 
revising socialism, or asking which socialism is feasible and w orthy of 
pursu it.18 The question is, can a reworked or im proved model of social­
ism serve as an ideal that is both attractive and feasible?
TV. The P olitics of Socialism
Even if the theoretical problem s of socialist economics could be over­
come, the future does not look bright for socialism. Socialists desire not 
merely prosperity  (albeit, a prosperity in which wealth is distributed 
more equitably than it has been in the past), bu t a classless society char­
acterized by "real" dem ocracy and "willing m utual service." It is no part 
of the socialist ideal that the good society be one in which the poor are 
dom inated by  the rich, or the weak are dom inated by the strong—or in 
which the right dom inate the wrong. Socialism envisages a society in 
which people cooperate willingly to produce and sustain a world that is 
both equitable and prosperous. A dictatorship, even of the wise and the 
good, has to be anathem a to socialism —despite the fact that socialists 
have too often in the past declared the need for a tem porary dictatorship
17 Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1982).
18 Norberto Bobbio, Which Socialism? Marxism, Socialism, and Democracy, trans. Roger Griffin, 
ed. Richard Bellamy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), esp. chap. 5.
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to usher in a new order. But this is w here socialism 's problem s begin. For 
if socialism repudiates dictatorship, w hat kind of politics can it endorse 
and aspire to, if socialist ideals are to be both attained and sustained? Is 
there a politics that will produce and m aintain socialism?
On this pressing problem, socialism has had surprisingly little to say. 
Perhaps, though, this will be found to have been not so surprising after all 
w hen the argum ent of this essay is concluded. Socialist thinkers have 
been quick to point out the shortcom ings of political societies under 
capitalism; and their analyses of the workings of the state, and the ways 
in which they serve particular interests rather than the common good, 
have often been acute and insightful.19 But they have had little to say 
about the political process by which a socialist society m ight come into 
being, and virtually nothing to say about the politics of the w ay a socialist 
society w ould work. Socialists have had even less to say about how  such 
a society w ould deal w ith the problem  of political power.
Yet w hy does this m atter? The reason it m atters is that, if socialism 
rejects dictatorship, it faces a fundam ental problem: a pluralist politics 
threatens to underm ine the entire socialist project. A pluralist political 
order is one that is pluralist in two respects. First, it is pluralist because 
political rule involves decision-making that is the outcom e of interaction 
(and very likely contestation) am ong a variety of political groups with 
distinct (even if overlapping) interests. Second, it is pluralist because 
these groups, w ith their distinct interests, are to some degree indepen­
dent, and capable of m arshalling their own resources to assert, argue for, 
and defend their interests in the political arena. Both dim ensions of p lu ­
ralism are im portant, if a political society is indeed to be regarded as 
pluralist. If there is no economic pluralism  because all groups are wholly 
dependent upon the ruling individual or group for access to resources, 
there can be no political pluralism  other than in nam e, for dependent 
groups w ould be powerless even to assert, m uch less defend, their inter­
ests. If, however, there is economic pluralism  bu t no mechanism by which 
independent groups can m ake a difference to political outcomes, the pol­
ity w ould not be a pluralist one. Either independent groups w ould be 
forced to conform —in which case, pluralism  vanishes—or they w ould be 
allowed to go their separate w ays—in which case, they w ould not be part 
of any political whole that m ight be regarded as pluralist. If socialism 
rejects dictatorship, it m ust embrace a politics that is to some degree 
pluralist. The question then becomes: W hy w ould a pluralist politics 
produce or sustain socialism?
19 A notable example is to be found in Marx's critique of Hegel's theory of the state, and, 
in particular, Hegel's account of the bureaucracy as attending to the interests of the univer­
sal class. See G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978). For Marx's critique, see the early essays: Karl Marx, "On the Jewish 
Question," in David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 39-62; and Karl Marx, "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: An 
Introduction," in McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 63-74.
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A part of the problem  for socialists here is that there is a fundam ental 
reason to expect a pluralist politics to repudiate socialism. Socialism re­
jects, and tries to suppress, economic pluralism . Socialism is hostile to 
economic pluralism  because economic pow er wielded by particular in­
terests rather than by the collective as a whole will serve only those 
interests, and at the same time will threaten to prom ote a distribution of 
goods that favors some over others. Capitalism  is the pluralistic economic 
system par excellence. In it, the smallest group, or even a single individ­
ual, can am ass substantial resources and, thus, considerable economic 
power. Capitalism is that economic system which is least subject to col­
lective control. And it is the economic system of which socialists are most 
critical—even if, to be sure, few socialists w ould prefer to return to pre­
capitalist m odes of production. Given that socialism is antipathetic to­
w ard economic pluralism , there is every reason for those individuals and 
groups not politically or ideologically committed to socialism to reject 
anything that proposes to deprive them  of their resources and dim inish 
their independence. Socialism, w hether or not it serves the general inter­
est, is not in the interest of particular interests.
U nder a pluralist politics, then, socialism is unlikely to win general 
support, even if socialist parties m ay be elected to office in a pluralist 
dem ocracy (Electoral victory need reflect nothing more than popular 
disaffection with other candidates and the victor's capacity to make the 
best use of the electoral system.) Historically, socialism has found little 
support anyw here, and has never had majority support for any signif­
icant length of time. (Social democratic parties, such as the British La­
bour Party, have been successful largely to the extent that they have 
dow nplayed their socialist ideals.) Socialist parties have more com­
monly come to pow er by force. They have from time to time won 
electoral victories—as, for example, did Salvador Allende's Frente de 
Accion Popular in 1970, in a coalition that secured 36 percent of the 
popular vote in Chile after prom ising to carry out a democratic transi­
tion to socialism.20 But attem pts to overthrow  or transform  capitalism 
have not m et with general support. Certainly, A llende's efforts to move 
toward socialism, even though his governm ent left large parts of the 
economy in private hands, produced vigorous opposition from those 
w ho stood to lose—as well as from political actors opposed, in princi­
ple, to such changes.
The point of all this is that socialist politics faces a major problem  that 
it has never properly confronted. If socialism repudiates dictatorship, and 
embraces a pluralist politics in which private interests retain the right and 
the capacity to act independently  to defend those interests, then socialism
20 Allende's coalition government, known as the Unidad Popular (UP), secured 44 per­
cent of the vote in popular elections in 1973, though this group included a greater range of 
parties, including Radicals, Social Democrats, and some disaffected members of the Chris­
tian Democrats, as well as the Socialists.
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will never get off the ground. For socialism is, in principle, opposed to a 
political system in which private interests hold sway. If socialism curbs 
those private interests, however, and subordinates them to the ruling 
group (albeit, one ruling in the nam e of the collective), then a pluralist 
politics will no longer exist, except possibly in name.
In one sense, however, this problem w ould remain, even if a major­
ity of people did support socialism. For unless support were more or 
less unanim ous, socialism w ould in effect end up suppressing those 
particular interests that repudiate socialism. U nder socialism, they would 
not have the capacity to use their resources to pursue their separate 
interests, since the proper use of those resources would be collectively 
determ ined.
The problem , in the end, is that people have different desires, different 
interests, and, m aybe m ost importantly, different ideas about w hat is 
good and bad, right and wrong. If so, a significant plurality  of any society 
is going to resist m oves to subordinate their interests to the interests of 
others (even if they are told that this is in the interest of the whole), and 
to subordinate their ideas of w hat is right to the ideas of others.
It is perhaps this problem  that has led so m any socialists to conclude 
that socialism requires a transform ation of hum an consciousness before 
there can be a transform ation into a truly socialist society. For some so­
cialists, this required a tem porary dictatorship of the proletariat, even if 
others m ay have been willing to w ait more patiently for a popular con­
vergence on socialist attitudes. But the assum ption that hum an conscious­
ness will be transform ed or that there will be a general convergence on 
socialist attitudes (so m uch so that people will cease to pursue their 
particular interests, or stop insisting on different views of w hat is right) is 
surely implausible. Yet if we grant that w e should assum e that people will 
differ, and that society will be m arked by  a plurality  of interests and 
moral attitudes (and, thus, by a plurality  of groups), it does not look like 
socialism is going to have m uch of a future.
Socialism's theoreticians have generally failed to deal with this issue. In 
the end, there sim ply is no political theory of socialism, even though there 
are socialist critiques of both capitalism and the liberal state.
V. R e t r i e v i n g  S o c i a l i s m
Now to say that there is no political theory of socialism is to m ake a 
large claim, and if it is correct it w ould suggest that the socialist ideal is 
in a parlous state. Yet it w ould be w rong to say that no socialists are aware 
of this lacuna in socialist theory, or that no one has tried to rem edy the 
deficiency. David Miller, for example, pointed out in 1989 that "ft]he 
socialist tradition has never developed an adequate theory of politics, in 
the sense of an account of w hat the nature, scope, and purpose of political
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activity should b e ."21 The influence of nineteenth-century positivism in 
this regard, Miller argues, probably exercised a malign influence on so­
cialist thinkers, from Marx to the Fabians, w ho tended to hold to an ideal 
of social organization that w as essentially nonpolitical: "Once conflicting 
class interests had been eliminated w ith the abolition of classes, the only 
rem aining question was how best to advance shared interests of all the 
m em bers of society. This was a technical, rather than a political, ques­
tion ."22 And Miller, for one, has m ade a significant attem pt to rem edy 
this deficiency in socialist theory. Nonetheless, the results have not been 
prom ising for socialism, and it is w orth considering w hy by examining 
m ore closely M iller's efforts to fill the gap.
According to Miller, w e need to distinguish two conceptions of politics: 
politics as "interest-aggregation" and politics as "dialogue." The first, he 
says, is associated w ith the liberal outlook, while the latter is appropriate 
to socialists. The first conceives politics as a process of bargaining am ong 
com peting interests, and its outcome is a com prom ise that com m ands the 
support of at least a bare majority.23 Politics as dialogue, however, con­
ceives of the political process as one characterized not by bargaining, but 
by attem pts at persuasion, and as one in which the outcom e is not com­
prom ise bu t consensus.24 The interest-aggregation model of politics, ac­
cording to Miller, has three flaws. First, it favors those w ho are powerful. 
Second, it does not distinguish between interests that are sound and those 
that are defective or even irrational, since reasons do not play any part in 
the process of reaching a decision. Third, since there is no rational method 
of aggregating preferences, the outcomes of interest-aggregation are in 
the end sim ply arbitrary.25 The dialogue model of politics, Miller argues, 
prom ises to do m uch better.
The dialogue model w ould do better, in fact, because it is through 
political dialogue that "collective identity and will" m ay be expressed 26 
For socialists wish to foster a sense of common identity; and the forging 
of a national identity is an im portant part of the purpose of political 
education 27 W hile liberals thus "attem pt to formulate a policy of toler­
ation which remains blind to the content of the beliefs and practices" of 
different cultures, socialist policy has to "take account of the interplay 
between public and private cultures." W hat is at stake is "citizen identi­
ty," which cannot be taken for granted: "[I]t m ay have to be protected 
against the encroachment of ethnic and other sectional loyalties."28
21 David Miller, Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism 









W hat Miller w ants to defend here is the political ideal of citizenship in 
the nation-state, which he sees as essential for the establishm ent of a 
socialist community. Such a state would, however, have to be a constitu­
tional state. For while the state has im portant functions to perform  (and 
Miller lists five: a protective function, a distributive function, economic 
m anagem ent, the provision of public goods, and self-reproduction29), it 
also has to solve two im portant problems. First, there is the problem  of 
how to prevent the bureaucracy from turning itself into a new ruling elite; 
and second, there is the problem  of how  to forge the popular will in a 
large, m odern society. For Miller, this requires a complex constitutional 
state: one in which there is no sovereign pow er in the Hobbesian sense, 
bu t in which pow er is hived off to various bodies, none of which is 
suprem e—though there w ould need to be a constitutional court to adju­
dicate disputes over the boundaries of authority.30 Thus, for example, 
given its role as economic manager, the state w ould have responsibility 
for m aking decisions about capital investm ent. But responsibility for m ak­
ing particular decisions w ould be left to autonom ous bodies—albeit, bod­
ies subject to the guidelines m andated by the constitution of a socialist 
state.31
The socialist state, according to Miller, m ust be a limited and constitu­
tional state. W iile  it has radical tasks to perform , m any of those tasks are 
best achieved in a roundabout way. As Miller explains:
It needs to bind itself internally by specifying the functions of each 
constituent body (legislative, adm inistrative, etc.) and appointing 
watch-dogs to guard the boundaries. Externally, its goals m ay best be 
achieved by, for instance, creating an appropriate incentive system 
and then allow ing m arkets to operate; or by establishing semi- 
autonom ous bodies acting under policy guidelines. It should not be 
the benevolent colossus of socialist m yth; but nor, for the same rea­
son, need it be the m alevolent leviathan of libertarian nightm are.32
This view of politics under socialism, however, is seriously flawed in 
two crucial respects. First, it rests upon assum ptions about political be­
havior that are altogether too optimistic and it neglects to deal w ith the 
problem  of political power. In this respect, it offers us, in the end, not so 
m uch a theory of politics as an account of w hat socialists hope politics 
will be like. Second, it does not m ake political space for the possibility 
that people m ight reject socialism. Yet a society of the sort that socialism 
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pants in a collective endeavor, cannot exist unless it is possible for people 
to reject this ideal.
The problem  w ith  socialism 's view of politics, in the end, is that it does 
not take seriously enough the problem  of lust: lust for political power. 
This is not because only a crude realist view of politics is admissible. 
There is more to political life than the simple exercise of force or the 
driving of hard bargains. Considerations of m orality have a role to play, 
no less than do considerations of honor, affection, advantage, and fear. 
But this complexity should not blind us to the fact that in politics the 
drive for pow er is of trem endous significance, w hether those pursuing it 
are m otivated by high-m inded ideals or by the desire to enrich them ­
selves, their families, and their friends. In this game, people will cheat, lie, 
and steal. O pponents will, from time to time, be blackmailed or killed, 
and colleagues will be betrayed. Rules will be bent, broken, rewritten, 
reinterpreted, and, w hen possible, ignored—all in the pursu it of political 
goals. Even in the freest and m ost open political system, political actors 
will be found to have embezzled money, covered up  law-breaking, misled 
the public, fiddled elections, bribed officials or im portant leaders of busi­
ness or labor, and generally been guilty of sleazy dealings. This is not the 
whole of politics, but it is certainly a part of its rich tapestry.
When w e consider this, the contrast Miller draw s between politics as 
dialogue and politics as interest-aggregation seems w ide of the m ark 
because it offers us a false account of the alternatives, contrasting a de­
scriptive theory w ith  a norm ative one. Those w ho have defended the 
interest-aggregation model of politics have not always been as sanguine 
as M iller's account im plies about the prospects of political bargaining 
producing outcom es that are truly reflective of the general interest. In­
deed, the only respect in w hich the interest-aggregation model is at all 
compelling is as an account of politics that em phasizes that the outcome 
of politics is always a compromise that reflects the strengths of the con­
testing parties in the process. The m om ent it begins to suggest that this 
outcome m ight somehow am ount to som ething that is good or desirable 
in itself, it becomes less persuasive. It is convincing only as a descriptive 
account, bu t not as a norm ative account, for as Miller quite rightly points 
out, the outcom e of interest-group bargaining is highly arbitrary. But this 
m eans that to contrast a descriptive account of politics—the interest- 
aggregation m odel—w ith  w hat is essentially a norm ative account—the 
dialogue m odel—is a little misleading.
But in any case, the dialogue model of politics is not particularly con­
vincing to the extent that it offers us little more than fine sentim ents about 
w hat politics ought to be like, w ith  little to reason to think that it could be. 
To be sure, in any decent political system  there will be an im portant 
element of d ialogue—for a political order in w hich reasons and argu­
m ents had no sway w ould be one in w hich hum anity  w as entirely absent. 
But it w ould be too m uch to expect reason and argum ent, or a disinter­
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ested concern for the common good, alw ays—or even regularly—to over­
come partiality, pride, or the sheer desire for power. The Athenians engaged 
in dialogue w ith the people of Melos and offered them reasons w hy they 
should surrender and subm it to A thenian rule. And the Melians, in turn, 
answered and explained w hy they w ould rather not. But the A thenians 
did not like that answ er and so slaughtered the m en of Melos, and en­
slaved the w om en and children.
W hat a socialist theory of politics needs to offer is not sim ply an as­
sertion that dialogue in search of consensus w ould be better. This is not 
only because consensus is not always better, or even possible—what, after 
all, w ould a consensus between A thens and Melos have looked like? We 
can easily accept that dialogue is generally better. W hat socialism needs 
to offer is a theory explaining w hy it thinks that a dialogic model of 
politics is possible. The liberal theory of politics assum es that it is not, 
because dialogue will not dom inate interest. According to the liberal 
view, political pow er is som ething that needs not so m uch to be har­
nessed as to be constrained. This is not because all m en are knaves, but 
because the risk of the abuse of power, and the devastating consequences 
such abuse can bring, compel us to make this assum ption. The best so­
lution is to divide and devolve pow er so that the harm  caused by the 
politically am bitious is m inim ized. But for this devolution to be effective, 
it m ust do m ore than sim ply establish a hierarchy under which pow er is 
formally divided. Pow er m ust also be separated, so that there are genu­
inely independent sources of pow er capable of challenging or resisting 
any authority  that threatens to misrule. Indeed, this kind of separation of 
pow er is necessary sim ply so that the ruled have the resources to scru­
tinize the w orkings of rulers. In the end, good governm ent cannot be 
m andated, or guaranteed by a constitution. Its existence can only be m ade 
a little less unlikely by institutions that m ake it difficult for any individ­
ual, group, or party  to rule unchecked.
M iller's theory of politics does not give the same w eight to this 
concern. W hile he is aw are of the danger of a ruling elite arising, his 
solution is for the state to "bind itself internally" and then appoint 
watchdogs. But from a liberal point of view, this does not take seri­
ously enough the problem of w ho will watch the watchdogs. W hat is 
needed, according to liberals, is not for the state to be internally bound, 
but for it to be externally accountable—for it to be watched by people 
w ho lie beyond its power. This will not prevent rulers from behaving 
corruptly, or stop other political actors from behaving badly in the 
pursu it of pow er or in their efforts to influence rulers to rule in their 
favor. But it should limit the dam age of corruption, particularly to the 
extent that the separation of pow ers in society places limits on the 
scope of state activity. The outcom e of such a politics will always be an 
imperfect compromise; bu t the point is not to obtain a particular highly 
desired outcome, bu t only to m inimize highly undesirable ones. Social­
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ist politics is not greatly sensitive to this concern. N or is it particularly 
sym pathetic to the liberal solution of decentralized social power. But 
this is not so surprising, since socialism is m arked by a hostility to any 
social order that is characterized by a diversity of competing, private 
interests. It w ants an order in which private interest is subordinated to 
the interest of the whole. W hat it has never offered us, however, is a 
convincing theory of the politics of such an order.
Socialists, in principle, are against dictatorship. But the problem  for 
a socialist politics that repudiates dictatorship is that it m ust leave 
open the possibility that socialism w ould  be rejected by the people 
through the political process. A nd this it has never been willing to 
d o —perhaps unsurprising ly  since to m any this w ould  am ount to an 
abandonm ent of the socialist ideal. Thus, socialists like Miller take very 
seriously the problem  of social reproduction, for socialism m ust pu t 
in place institutions that make it unlikely that socialism will be re­
jected in the future. Yet the more seriously this is done, the less scope 
there is for people to reject socialism. Either their choices will be lim ­
ited or their desire to m ake particular changes will be reshaped by the 
socialist polity. Yet this significantly weakens any claim socialism m ight 
be able to m ake that it is a political system  that is a voluntary scheme 
of social cooperation or, in C ohen 's w ords, "a real and  com plete 
democracy."
Now it m ight be argued that the sam e goes for liberalism or for capi­
talism: these also are self-reproducing and  self-perpetuating political and 
economic systems. Yet this is sim ply not so —or, at least, not in the same 
way. As Schum peter pointed out in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 
one of capitalism 's m ost striking features is its propensity to create and 
nurture people w ho are critical of capitalism. Indeed, Schum peter saw in 
this feature of capitalism  the seeds of its own destruction. Capitalism  was 
unlikely to survive, he thought, because it d id  not generate its own ideo­
logical support, but, on the contrary  gave succor to an intellectual elite 
that was highly critical of its workings.33
The same point could equally be m ade about liberalism. Liberal po­
litical system s are notew orthy not only for tolerating a w ide variety of 
ways of life, bu t also for accepting, and  upholding, the freedom  of 
dissenters to criticize and try to change the liberal order. Liberals will 
accept w ithin their political m idst communists, fascists, anarchists, con­
servatives, and  religious zealots, as well as socialists, social democrats, 
and m arket socialists. Indeed, because it is characterized by a devolu­
tion of both authority  and social power, a liberal order m ay well con­
tain subgroups or substate system s (say in a federation) that are run 
according to illiberal principles. Liberals, if they are consistent, will 
press for the devolution of pow er (or the acceptance of devolved power)
33 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, chap. 22.
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before they will call for the enforcement of liberal principles w ithin any 
political association or group.34
Socialism, unlike liberalism, however, attaches great im portance to so­
cial u n ity  and sees in political activity an opportunity  to bring about an 
end to the divisions that m ark a society in w hich private interests have 
free reign. But the trouble w ith political activity is that if people are 
allowed the freedom to engage in politics, they will not only push in 
different directions, bu t also decline to push (in sufficient num bers) to­
w ard socialism. W hat is needed from socialist political theory is an ex­
planation of how  there can be a political order in which people are both 
free to choose socialism and actually do choose socialism—w ithout that 
order being sim ply one in which majority preference subordinates that of 
the minority. W hat is needed is an explanation not of w hy a nondictato- 
rial socialist politics is desirable, bu t how  such a politics is possible.
VI. Conclusion
Socialism w as perhaps the m ost im portant political m ovem ent of the 
twentieth century. It was the ideology that guided or m otivated some of 
the m ost am bitious attem pts to transform  society in order to create a 
better w orld. It dom inated politics in India, China, and the Soviet Union 
and its satellites, as well as the agendas of m ajor political parties through­
out Western Europe. For m uch of that time, the future of socialism was 
thought to be a prom ising one, and theoretical discussions asserted or 
assum ed its coming success, w hile the argum ents of its detractors were 
dismissed. Its economics was alleged to be more productive and its pol­
itics m ore in tune w ith the twentieth century 's turn tow ard democratic 
equality. The failure of socialism, however, has revealed that its economic 
theory is untenable, and its political theory is nonexistent. The former 
failing has been well understood for some time. But the failure of social­
ism to develop a plausible political theory has not been fully recognized. 
One consequence of this latter failing is that socialists continue to try to 
develop socialist theories of justice and equality  even though it is hard to 
see how  this could be of any interest in the absence of a socialist theory 
of politics.
Yet perhaps this does not m uch matter. For if the argum ent of this essay 
is to be believed, there is no plausible theory of politics that w ould prove 
of m uch help to socialists—at least for as long as they continue to hold on 
to socialism 's original ideals rather than sim ply to, say  an ideal of liberal 
equality. Liberal politics, in the end, has only one aim: to prevent tyranny. 
This is vital if liberty is to be enjoyed by the people. The m odern eco­
34 I recognize that this is a controversial point. I have defended this view at length in 
Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003).
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nomic system m ost compatible w ith this aim is capitalism; and liberals 
are, by and large, willing to accept the outcom es that this system gener­
ates, including economic inequality and political com prom ise—even com­
prom ise w ith socialist dem ands. Socialism, however, w ants a politics that 
will combine nontyranny w ith a particular outcome: socialism. But this is 
not possible because, in a nontyrannical political order, a variety of out­
comes is possible, and outcomes will change from time to time. Thus, if 
socialists w ant to preserve nontyranny, they will have to w ork w ithin the 
pluralist politics of liberalism (avoiding proposals that will weaken checks 
on power) and give up on the possibility of an enduring socialist polity  
This, from a socialist point of view, is not a happy  fate. But it m ust, after 
all, be the kind of fate to which any ideology m ust reconcile itself if it is 
so m istaken as to hope to see a society that honors its principles and 
places them above politics. For as long as people have a propensity to 
think for them selves and to think differently, no political ideology will 
win a perm anent, or even a particularly enduring, victory This goes for 
socialism as m uch as it does (alas) for one of the major alternatives to 
socialism, which, as it happens, also lacks any sort of a theory of politics: 
the libertarian theory of the minimal state.35
Politics, Australian Defence Force Academy
35 Libertarianism is subject to the same problem that socialism faces: if it tolerates plu­
ralism and repudiates dictatorship, there is no reason to think that libertarian principles will 
generally be embraced or chosen by the political process. By libertarianism, I mean the 
political theories associated with such thinkers as Robert Nozick, Ayn Rand, and Murray 
Rothbard, rather than the liberal tradition (from John Locke to F. A. Hayek) more generally.
